

# Venture

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## NEW PHASE IN KENYA

**P**OLITICALLY speaking, Kenya has now entered on the most difficult stage in its history. For a generation, since Europeans and Indians were granted the franchise, politicians of all communities have achieved prominence by permanent opposition. For a generation, the Colonial Office and the Kenya Government have been the whipping boys in every crisis. Now they are sharing their power with unofficial Ministers drawn from all communities. Unofficials must learn the full implications—in the practical terms of the day-to-day life of a Government—of the final responsibility of the Secretary of State for the conduct of affairs in Kenya. This is a difficult transition anywhere. It affords the opportunity for startling success, as in the Gold Coast, or for dismal failure, as in British Guiana. Everybody will hope that the Kenya leaders will be as successful in working with their officials as Dr. Nkrumah has been.

Their position is infinitely more difficult than that of the Gold Coast Ministers. Dr. Nkrumah has behind him a country sufficiently united to sustain a party government. No politician in Kenya can command such support. For the first time, unofficial Ministers must defend their policies before a legislature, but none is in a position to wield an effective party whip. Moreover, unless they can instil into their followers the constructive spirit which impelled them to take office, none will survive the next election.

Excluding the influence and authority of the Governor, which in the circumstances must continue to be very great, there appears to be only one thing binding these men together—the conviction that responsibility in Kenya must be shared between all three races. From the confusion which broke out when the Secretary of State made his proposals in March, this is the one solid fact that emerges. There were objections from every

community. The African Members of Legislative Council have not given their full support yet. The most they could do was to agree that they would not stand in the way of any one of their number who agreed to take office. But even they, disappointed with the 'third place in their own country' which they had been offered, nevertheless agreed that 'a multi-racial Government must be the future of Kenya.'<sup>1</sup> To achieve it, all the leaders had to act as representatives rather than as delegates of their communities. Mr. Blundell accepted without consulting his constituents, although he was given their support later. Mr. Patel accepted before the Kenya Indian Congress had given its verdict. The Arabs at first objected to the whole arrangement. Mr. Nathoo appears to have had no trouble to face. Mr. Ohanga, the African Minister for Community Development, toured his constituency first and received support at public meetings. The rigid control of representatives by parties and organisations, which is a standing menace to the development of democratic institutions in Africa, has thus been avoided in Kenya at the outset.

This has not, however, been achieved painlessly. Of the 14 European Elected Members in the legislature, three now sit on the Government bench as Ministers. Eleven sit on the other side, five of them having resigned from the European Elected Members' Organisation. In the country, the Electors' Union is committed to trying to make the constitution work, but some of its branches are reported to be hostile, while the dissidents of the Federal Independence Party skirmish ineffectively on the extreme right. The six African member appear to be dispirited and divided, conscious of having been cold-shouldered in the negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> *East African Standard*, 12/3/54



bitter at the rejection of their moderate demand for two portfolios. Mr. Eliud Mathu, senior African Member, who has sat in the Legislative Council since 1944, resigned from the Executive Council when the one portfolio was not offered to him, convinced that no trust would be placed in a Kikuyu. No African organisation has yet emerged to take the place of the Kenya African Union, and the African Members have no organised electorate behind them.

It is impossible, then, at this stage, to say how much political support there is for the new Government. Nor can one guess at its own success or difficulty in achieving unity of purpose. The Council of Ministers now consists of the Governor and Deputy-Governor, six officials, three European Elected Members as Ministers (one without portfolio), two Elected Asian Ministers (one without portfolio), and one African Minister. There are also two Africans and one Arab as Under-Secretaries. The Council of Ministers is the principal instrument of policy and must accept collective responsibility. Its members have also been obliged to agree 'to refrain from proposing or supporting legislation which in any way concerns the special rights of racial communities in those areas established for their respective use by treaty, Order-in-Council, or ordinance,' until elections are held in 1960. It is hoped that on this basis the Government may be able to hold together, and that a proper link between the executive and the legislature may for the first time be forged.

It has taken the shock of the emergency to produce this change. As late as April, 1953, Mr. Lyttelton gave an assurance in the House of Commons that there would be no constitutional change or allocation of portfolios to unofficials until the emergency was over. But events have overtaken the policy of retaining official control. The Parliamentary Delegation which visited Kenya in January advocated a change. When it came, the African Members did not object to the sharing of official responsibility. We ourselves would have preferred to see some agreement reached between the races before portfolios were handed to unofficials, bearing in mind the bitter experience of Northern Rhodesia. But it is clear that something had to be done in Kenya, and the positive fact is that the first African Minister south of the equator has taken office. This is a great advance for the Africans, however badly we may think they have been handled in other respects. Certainly it is an advance bitterly resented by such extremists as Lady Shaw, who is reported to consider the changes ill-timed and 'a perfect example of what these frightful itinerant politicians can do.'<sup>1</sup>

The present arrangements are experimental until the next general election, which will be held within six months of the end of the emergency or on June 30, 1955, whichever is the later. If the electorate then returns members who are willing to serve in the Government on the present basis, there will be no change before 1960. The Government will in any case, before 1956, 'initiate a study, in which Africans will play a prominent part, of the best method for choosing African members of the Legislative Council.' It will thus be plunged straight into the main problem of representation in Kenya, which has been discussed *ad nauseam* in this journal as well as in all others concerned with East and Central Africa, without any acceptable solution having been produced. How are the Africans to vote? Which Africans are to vote? And when?

It is in this discussion that the main danger faces Kenya. How easy it will be to grant a restricted franchise, to ensure that the vote is on a separate register any way and cannot therefore swamp the immigrant races, to explain to the Africans that this is all the Europeans can be persuaded to agree to and therefore they must accept it! But this will not be good enough. At present it looks as though the chief threat to the new multi-racial Government will come from the Europeans. But in the long run it is more likely to be threatened by the Africans. Their leaders are disappointed and humiliated, despite the elevated position of Mr. Ohanga. Even in the next election, they are not to be given an opportunity, through a franchise, of establishing an effective and indisputable link with their constituents. They are still heavily outnumbered in the legislature. There is to be no common roll until after 1960. Why, then, can there not be parity in the legislature, at least on the Tanganyika model? This is a reform which the new multi-racial Government can propose without swamping the European and Asian communities. Someone must take his courage in both hands before 1956 if the African leaders are not to be regarded, and publicised, as mere stooges by any dissident leader who may arise from the fertile soil of Kenya's emergency.

Kenya is not the only country concerned in this. By the test of multi-racial government there the whole policy of 'partnership' in East and Central Africa will be judged. What is it to lead to? Permanent entrenchment for small minorities? A genuine chance for African political advancement? 'In regard to these multi-racial nations,' Mr. James Griffiths has said,<sup>1</sup> 'if our policy is to succeed there has to be democracy, and if there is democracy, then all of them, in that sense, will be

<sup>1</sup> *East African Standard*, 26/3/54.

<sup>1</sup> House of Commons, *Hansard*, 2/12/53.



African states.' That is the ultimate test of the 'partnership' period. It cannot be applied now. But that must be the aim. If Kenya's new Government can show reasonable progress in that direction before 1960, it stands a chance of gaining African support and becoming a real multi-racial Government with political support behind it.

## **Comment**

### **STILL RETRENCHING**

THE Colonial Development Corporation's report for 1953<sup>1</sup> reveals that the retrenching process continues, although the benefits of economies and reorganisation are not expected to show fully until 1954 or later. The initial effect can be seen in a smaller operating loss—£148,247 in 1953 as against £551,474 in 1952. Seven schemes were abandoned in the year, including the Niger Agricultural Project at Mokwa. This closure is probably the most tragic, and the failure amongst the least excusable. The aim was to combine mechanised cultivation with land settlement on a tenancy basis—thus avoiding the disadvantages of the plantation system while reaping the benefit of large-scale planning and equipment. Early progress reports were not hopeful, revealing from the outset that preparations had been inadequate. The settlers, chosen by native authorities, were reported to be unsatisfactory, and have remained so. This was not the fault of the Corporation, but the absence of preliminary investigation of technical problems—still unsolved—certainly was. There is a danger that over enthusiasm is now being followed by excessive caution. Of the fifty continuing projects, the Corporation is directly and solely responsible for 16 only. In others, it is associated with colonial Governments and with private enterprise, the former to be welcomed, but the latter surely highly questionable, since the Report itself states that the 'results of private enterprise participation and management are still uneven.' If this policy is pushed too far, the initial purpose of the Corporation—to do jobs which private enterprise has failed to do—may become totally submerged in the desire to make the Corporation pay—which it can never do if profitable enterprises are passed on to private enterprise on the model of the Tory Government's handling of the British transport services. In starting new projects the Corporation is now guided by the principle that

<sup>1</sup> new projects must continue on stringent analysis

<sup>1</sup> Colonial Development Corporation: *Report and Accounts for 1953*. H.M. Stationery Office, 2s.

to show likelihood of being financially self-supporting at least; to permit of commercial association and, wherever possible, of association with local governments direct or indirect.'

Past experience shows how essential the 'stringent analysis' is, but present experience is showing the need to consider the functions of the Corporation and its relation to colonial economic policy as a whole. On some points, the Corporation itself would obviously welcome this. Having failed to grow bananas in its Stann Creek project in British Honduras, it has started on citrus. The Report states bluntly:

'Negotiations were in progress with private enterprise for participation in finance and management, but these were broken off when it was heard that United Kingdom intended to import fresh citrus and canned grapefruit from U.S.A.; further plantings have also been stopped.'

Meanwhile, British Honduras is saddled with its unemployed and votes anti-British at its first universal suffrage election. There is no reason to believe that the Corporation cannot do its job, and there is every reason to avoid the niggling hostile criticism which besets the path of public corporation if politicians try to make party capital out of them, but it is high time that some alarms were sounded.

### **LET THEM EARN**

THE West Indian delegation which has come to London to ask for a citrus agreement is only asking us to recognise the right of the Caribbean Colonies to earn a decent living. They already have a long-term agreement with Britain for the purchase of sugar, negotiated under the Labour Government. Now they want protection for their citrus, much of it developed since the war to prevent dependence on a single crop. We have never understood why Colonies should have to send top-level delegations to this country before the Ministry of Food will listen to them. Even the Labour Government had to be pressed into making the sugar agreement, while the Conservatives have actually agreed to allow the Americans to send, under Mutual Security arrangements, \$5m. worth of fruit which in effect they pay us to buy. Britain is virtually the only market for citrus from the West Indies, which already have to face competition from Cuban sugar, Cuban cigars and Brazilian bananas, all exported under conditions which amount to subsidisation. Meanwhile, we spend a few thousands annually on Colonial Development and Welfare grants and watch the West Indian boats bringing in to Britain men and women who have no future at home. It is time this idiotic treatment of the West Indies was stopped. The Labour Government's sugar agreement, which provided an efficiency guarantee by



leaving part of the market free, was an effective answer to the danger of subsidising inefficient production.

It is possible to safeguard the British consumer from unnecessarily high prices without starving the West Indies out. As the Conservative Govern-

ment proceeds to dismantle the bulk purchase system, many other Colonies may be affected, as the table on page 7 shows. If that is done, the Colonies will lose one of the principal defences against poverty erected under the Labour Government.

## LESSONS FROM INDO-CHINA

by Colin Jackson

**A**RGUMENTS on just why the Indo-China dispute broke out and who was to blame have now become the favourite occupation of many of our hindsighted politicians and journalists.

Certain facts about Indo-China however seem to require no latter-day wisdom. Firstly, it is obvious that the seeds of this present conflict were already laid before World War II. The French never allowed a free and unfettered nationalist movement to develop in Indo-China. Despite the suppression of civil disobedience campaigns, there was sufficient freedom of expression and organisation to enable Congress to climb to power in India. Any challenge in Indo-China along the lines practised in India meant a speedy execution by the French. The result of this repression was that the nationalist movement in this French Colony was driven underground and into the hands of the extremists.

Secondly, in the period 1945-47 France failed to adjust herself to the post-war changed position of the colonial powers in Asia. It seems that succeeding French Governments had no idea that it would be impossible to go back to the traditional pattern of colonial government. Thus whilst Britain laid the basis of her present friendship with India in this period, France sowed the seeds of her own destruction.

However, the French failure in 1945 and 1946 could have been retrieved by a liberal and progressive policy in 1947 and 1948. Had the French used these two years to support genuine nationalist parties such as the Dai Viet, while Ho Chi Minh remained a relatively weak rebel, then Vietnamese feeling towards some form of association with France might have been favourable. Instead, during these two years the French made no attempt to recruit any worthwhile Vietnamese to their side and the case of nationalism went by default to the Vietminh.

Even after 1949 it might not have been too late to come to some satisfactory agreement with the local people. Instead, the French all along supported the dictatorial and arbitrary actions of the Emperor Bao Dai who himself was a very pliant puppet. When I was in Saigon last autumn I met many able non-Communist Vietnamese who complained bitterly of how their attempts to wrest genuine independence from the French were frustrated by Bao Dai. In the North the Tonkinese under Governor Tre are even more forceful in their demands for independ-

ence from the Communists as well as from the French, and their frustration is thereby the greater.

The present batch of self-government promises cannot succeed because they have not been anticipated by the necessary building up of administrative departments and officials that would allow self-government to succeed. The French have always made a point of keeping a firm hold over the civil service, the judiciary, and the financial branches of government. They have until very recently deliberately vetoed any plan for bringing in Vietnamese. If self-government were to be successful to-day, training for responsibility should have begun at least at the end of World War II. The policy of the French in Indo-China has always been a policy of giving too little too late and in the wrong spirit.

What of the future? I feel that there is far too ready an assumption that Ho Chi Minh is just a stooge of Communist China. Granted, the long and mounting battle has made Vietminh increasingly dependent on Peking for their ultimate victory. And obviously Mao Tse Tung will exact his price. But assuming that Ho Chi Minh's régime does eventually control the whole of Vietnam—and free elections would certainly mean this—then any Chinese intervention in the country would have to be extremely discreet. Probably there is no race more unpopular, due to a history of invasion, than are the Chinese amongst the people of Indo-China. Ho Chi Minh even now has to be particularly careful to make sure that the non-Communist Vietnamese cannot charge him with allowing Chinese troops to fight on his side.

Secondly, as an independent country Ho Chi Minh is unlikely to want Communist Chinese stooges around his territory. There is no reason why he should, for instance, prefer Peking-dominated governments in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok to the present régimes. With Communist China supreme to the South and West his independence would soon become illusory. In other words, it need not follow that the victory of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China would mean that the whole of South-east Asia would fall under the control of Peking.

Finally, Indo-China raises a larger and more far-reaching problem for Britain. British people must decide what their attitude is to be towards Colonies that in a free exercise of their choice choose Communism. For instance, in British Guiana, it cannot be argued as it could be over Czechoslovakia that



Communism triumphed because of intimidation or defeat from within. Indo-China, according to our theories for development in the Commonwealth, should cease to become a Colony—that is, the French should allow the peoples of this region to choose not only their relationship with the French but also the ideology of the government to rule. But here arises a big question-mark over our happy ending development theory, because there is a conflict between this theory of progressive independence and international ideological considerations. Bluntly, should the Colony remain French regardless of the people in order to keep Malaya, Singapore and Australia safe? Or should the people be allowed to exercise their own choice and thereby possibly

threaten our friends?

At the moment the Labour Party hasn't faced up to this question. Indo-China finds British Socialists faced with this conflict with their conscience. America's pathological hatred of Communism makes her answer to this conflict clear. France probably doesn't now have a choice. However, the attitude of Labour in Britain will be watched by many as yet uncommitted and undecided countries like India and Indonesia. This is not the place to give some dogmatic answer. Certainly, however, Indo-China demands a lot of fresh thinking on the whole question of independence in colonial territories. Socialists in Britain and elsewhere cannot continue to sit on the fence and at the same time be respected.

## LABOUR FIGHTS MALAN

by E. S. Sachs

THE Nationalist Government of Dr. Malan is an avowed enemy of the free trade union movement. In 1936 his party started a campaign of disruption, slander and violence against trade unions and their leaders, concentrating on those unions which have a preponderance of Afrikaner workers, e.g. the Mineworkers' Union, the Garment Workers' Union, the Building Workers' Union, etc. The campaign, conducted on typical Nazi lines, met with a measure of success only in the Mineworkers' Union. Charlie Harris, the anti-nationalist secretary of that union, was shot dead by a young Nationalist in June, 1939, and in 1948, when Malan came to power, the union came under complete control of the Nats.

Having failed to capture or disrupt most of the other trade unions, the Malan Government decided to introduce a new Industrial Conciliation Bill which is now before the Union Parliament designed to kill free trade unionism. The numerous provisions of the Bill are framed to split the trade unions on racial lines, deprive them of any real power of collective bargaining, and place control of unions in the hands of the Minister of Labour. Strikes are prohibited under penalties of three years imprisonment and £500 fine, splinter groups of nationalist stooges will be encouraged to 'hive off' and set up their own 'pure white' unions, and the Industrial Registrar will have the power to award these splinters assets of the old-established unions.

The entire trade union movement, Left, Right and Centre realised that the very existence of trade unionism was at stake, and a Unity Conference of the six different national trade union centres was held in Cape Town at the beginning of May. Sixty-eight trade unions with a total membership of 221,526 were represented. The Conference almost unanimously passed resolutions opposing the Bill. But verbal opposition has no effect upon Nationalist Ministers, and unless the opposition is backed up by determined action, Mr. B. J. Scholman, Nationalist

Minister of Labour, will rush his fascist measure through Parliament.

The Unity Committee responsible for organising the conference committed one serious blunder. It decided not to invite the African trade unions, which means that 75 per cent. of the workers of South Africa were not represented. The overwhelming majority of white workers oppose nationalist interference in the trade unions, and given a proper lead would fight against the tyrannical policy of the Nationalist Government. It remains to be seen whether such a lead will be forthcoming. The mass of African workers would fight Malan willingly, and their labour power is decisive in almost every industry. Unfortunately they have not yet succeeded in creating effective trade union organisations. The will is there, but they lack the technical resources, funds for the hire of offices, halls, printing, etc. The British trade union movement has repeatedly passed resolutions of support for the oppressed African workers, but resolutions are not enough. One million African workers can be organised into powerful trade unions, and the only way of breaking down racial division in the South African trade union movement is by helping to create powerful African trade unions.

It is gratifying to note that the political wing of the Labour movement in South Africa, the South African Labour Party, has in recent years made tremendous progress in its policy towards non-Europeans. The small band of Labour Members of Parliament—five out of a total of 159 in the Union House of Assembly—has consistently and courageously opposed every reactionary measure of the Nationalist Government. At its last annual conference held some months ago, the Party adopted a new and far more progressive policy on race relations than it had ever done before.

These are powerful trends at work against the Nationalists in the Union. All British Socialists will hope that they can be made politically effective.



# OPINION . . .

## THE CONSTITUTION OF MALAYA

*The Secretary of State has now received the proposals of the High Commissioner and the Sultans of Malaya on constitutional reform, following the report of the Committee on elections to the Federal Legislative Council (see April 'Venture,' page 1). He replied on April 20, accepting the principle of an elected majority. The new proposals provide for 52 elected members in a Council of 98, the non-elected bloc consisting of 3 ex-officio, 11 State and Settlement members, 3 to represent racial minorities, 7 as a nominated reserve, and 22 to speak for scheduled interests, including 4 for trade unions (instead of 2, as recommended in the Report). The views of Malayan political organisations are given below.*

### 1. The UMNO-MCA Alliance.

The Alliance (United Malayan National Organisation and the Malayan Chinese Association, which claim a combined membership of 500,000) has sent a delegation to London which issued a statement on May 4. Extracts are given below:—

... The main object of the Alliance is Independence for Malaya which, as we have declared, will remain within the Commonwealth of Nations. . .

We believe that the first step towards self-government is the holding of elections. The Alliance held several round-table conferences, during which there was complete unanimity of opinion between the two major races that an elected legislature should be the first step towards the attainment of self-government. Our organisations formulated a blue print for elections on a Federal level and for constitutional changes arising therefrom. The main points of this blueprint are:—

- (1) That national elections should be held in the Federation of Malaya for at least two-thirds of the members of the Federal Legislative Council . . .
- (4) That in addition to Federal citizens and Subjects of the Rulers, the following should be given the right to vote in Federal Elections—
  - (a) Any person BORN in any part of the territories now comprising the Federation of Malaya and ordinarily resident in the Federation of Malaya for the last five years immediately preceding the election, and
  - (b) British subjects BORN in Singapore and ordinarily resident in the Federation of Malaya for the last seven years immediately preceding the election. . . .
- (6) That Federal elections should be held not later than November, 1954. . .

The Federal Elections Committee consisted of 46 members, of whom only seven were members of the Alliance. This Committee appointed among themselves a Working Party of 20 members, of whom only five were from the Alliance. It will be seen, therefore, that in both the Committee and the Working Party the Alliance was heavily outnumbered.

In Working Party meetings, the Alliance, in the spirit of goodwill and compromise, agreed that a

minimum of three-fifths of the members of the Federal Legislative Council should be elected. The Alliance regards this as the absolute minimum for the purpose of making possible the working of the party system of government based on the principles of Parliamentary Democracy.

The High Commissioner and Their Highnesses, however, took a different view. They have recommended that there should be an elected majority of six, and this has been agreed to by the Secretary of State for the Colonies . . . this small elected majority will make it impossible for the operation of the Party system of Government based on the principles of Democracy. Also it would hardly provide sufficient incentive to the people to participate in the elections, as they would feel that they were denied a fair share in the government of their country. . .

As the result of the Secretary of State's refusal to meet our delegation in the first instance, the Alliance passed a resolution that they now wanted a fully-elected Federal Legislative Council. It was with this mandate that we were directed to come to London. . .

Since the end of World War II there has been a high tide of nationalism in the whole of South-east Asia, and this has considerable effect on Malaya. This rise of nationalism in Malaya has brought about the unity of the two major races as symbolised by the Alliance and this nationalism, if rightly channelled, will be a real, effective force in the fight against Communism.

In the circumstances we consider that it is not too late for Her Majesty's Government to review further the agreed proposals of the High Commissioner and Their Highnesses the Rulers. Under Section 8, Part II of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, Their Highnesses the Rulers must accept the advice of the High Commissioner who is the accredited representative of Her Majesty's Government in Malaya. We, therefore, urge that in the true interest of the country as a whole, a review be made in the light of our proposals and Their Highnesses the Rulers be accordingly advised.'

### II. The Pan-Malayan Labour Party

'The Pan-Malayan Labour Party regards the



Government White Paper embodying the despatches between the High Commissioner and the Malay Rulers and the Secretary of State for the Colonies which was published yesterday, as most disappointing. It does not satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of Malaya for national independence. The very slender majority recommended for the elected seats is unrealistic and ineffective.

The PMLP had no part in the decision of the Federal Elections Committee. It was not a party to the recommendations made by the Committee. Therefore it views even those sections of the report which purport to be the unanimous views of the Committee as not sufficiently reflecting the views of all sections of the people.

The PMLP reaffirms its stand for a fully elected legislature, though it is prepared, as an interim measure, to agree to the nomination of not more than four ex-officio members representing the British

Government and 11 members representing the 11 State and Settlement Governments.

The Party is greatly dissatisfied with the franchise qualifications which deprive a substantial number of local born and domiciled people from exercising their vote. This will create a situation where a large number of people in this country will be excluded from identifying themselves with the Government of the country.

The PMLP reiterates its demand for national elections in 1954. It stands by its pledge to the people to withdraw all its representatives from the Legislative Council if elections were not held by December 31, 1954.

The PMLP calls upon the people to stand united and in readiness to take concerted action to manifest their determination for a fully elected council.'

Lee Moke Sang

(General Secretary).

Penang, 29.4.54.

## THE BASIS OF APARTHEID

The Prime Minister of South Africa has sent a statement (published in full in "South Africa," April 10, 1954, page 259) on apartheid to the Rev. J. H. Piersma, of the Christian Reformed Church, Grand Rapids, U.S.A. Extracts are given below:—

'... apartheid, separation, segregation, or differentiation ... is part and parcel of the South African tradition as practised since the first Dutch settlement at the Cape in 1652 and still supported by the large majority of white South Africans of the main political parties.

The deep-rooted colour consciousness of the white South Africans—a phenomenon quite beyond the comprehension of the uninformed—arises from the fundamental difference between the two groups, white and black. The difference in colour is merely the physical manifestation of the contrast between two irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarity and civilisation, between heathenism and Christianity, and finally between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and insignificant numbers on the other. Such it was in the early beginnings, and such it largely remains. ...

From the outset the European colonists were far outnumbered. There is no doubt that if they had succumbed to the temptation of assimilation, they would have been submerged in the black heathendom of Africa as effectively as if they had been completely annihilated. Of necessity they had to arm and protect themselves against this ever-growing menace, and how could it better be done than by throwing an impenetrable armour around themselves—the armour of their distinctive racial identity and self-preservation? ...

This, then, is the basis of apartheid ...

... apartheid is based on what the Afrikaner believes to be his divine calling and his privilege—to

convert the heathen to Christianity without obliterating his national identity. ...

... the basis upon which the Afrikaans Churches have, ever since their establishment, approached South Africa's complex, multi-racial problem. With due regard to their historical background I may summarise these principles as follows:—

- (1) Missionary work has been practised in this country from the early beginnings as being the Christian duty of the settlers to the heathen. Only afterwards were the principles formulated which govern the racial policy of the State and of the established Churches here. ...
- (2) The Church believes that God in his wisdom so disposed it that the first white men and women who settled at the foot of the Black Continent were profoundly religious people, imbued with a very real zeal to bring the light of the Gospel to the heathen nations of Africa. ...
- (4) In the early beginnings the Church used the blessings of civilisation as a means to attract the heathen, but to-day the traditional concept of European guardianship has taken the form of fostering and financing to the full the social, educational and economic development of the non-white ... the Church has at all times vouchsafed the various black races the right and duty to retain their national identities. Christianity must not rob the non-white of his language and culture. Its function is to permeate and penetrate to the depths of his nationalism, whilst encouraging him to retain and refine those national customs and traditions which do not clash with the Christian tenets.
- (5) The traditional fear of the Afrikaner of racial equality (equalitarianism) between white and black derives from his aversion to miscegenation. The Afrikaner has always believed very firmly that if he is to be true to his primary calling of bringing Christianity to the heathen, he must preserve his racial identity intact. The Church



is therefore entirely opposed to inter-marriage between black and white and is committed to withstand everything that is calculated to facilitate it. At the same time it does not begrudge the non-white the attainment of a social status commensurate with his highest aspirations. Whereas the Church, therefore, opposes the social equalitarianism which ignores racial and colour differences between white and black in every-day life, it is prepared to do all in its power to implement a social and cultural segregation which will redound to the benefit of both sections.

- (7) . . . The Church acknowledges the basic rights of the State as a particular divine institution to regulate the lives and action of its citizens.'

Dr. Malan went on to deal in detail with the political and social application of the principles outlined above, as implemented by the National Party Government during the last five years.

**Dr. Malan's statement provoked a reply from Father Trevor Huddleston, C.R. ("South Africa," April 17, 1954, page 285), who commented as follows:**

'It is a dangerous theological speculation to assume that because White men and women settled on the continent of Africa 300 years ago, their descendants have been chosen by God to maintain White supremacy for ever. . . I cannot see any grounds for this in the Holy Scripture. Every colonial power could make the same claim. It is wrong to claim the protection of Divine Providence for any racial theory. . . .

Dr. Malan says: "To the Europeans millions of semi-barbarous blacks look for guidance, justice and the Christian way of life." I agree. But they do not find any of these things in the conduct of their apartheid-conscious overlords.'

**The South African Institute of Race Relations (P.O. Box 97, Johannesburg) has issued the text of a letter to Dr. Malan signed by Mr. Quintin Whyte and Dr. Ellen Hellman, which includes the following:**

'You state . . . that a "fundamental difference" exists between Black and White and that "the difference in colour is merely the physical manifestation of the contrast between two irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarism and civilisation and between heathenism and Christianity." Yet you refer, rightly, to the great work of the Afrikaner (in which he was not alone) in following "his divine calling and his privilege—to convert the heathen to Christianity." We must submit that the missionary who seeks to convert the heathen denies, in so doing, that differences are "fundamental" and "irreconcilable," for his action rests on the belief that man can be and often is fundamentally changed. We hold, with the missionary, that the barbarian and heathen does by conversion and faith aided by education, environment and example become, in fact, a "new man." If this were not true those South Africans who, as you say, "lit a torch which was carried to the farthest corners of the sub-continent" lit the torch in vain: for, according to your view, the fully qualified African doctor remains fundamentally a barbarian and the African Minister of a Christian Church is still a

heathen. . . . You continue to equate "black" with "barbarism," and to deny the possibility of changing the Native in any "fundamental" sense, even through the agency of Christianity. The whole history of the Western world, which is one of progress from tribal barbarism to civilisation and from heathenism to Christianity, is evidence against this contention. . . .

This basic premise of yours seems to us to underlie your whole concept of "separate development," and of the consequent duty of the Church to help preserve "intact" what you call the "national identity" of the black group. Such national identity, in so far as it is defined, would seem, according to your theory, to rest on tribal—and therefore primitive—foundations, with social and economic rights pegged permanently at a lower level than those of the Europeans. To that extent the theory is already an anachronism: vast numbers of Africans, permanently settled in the towns, are no longer tribal in their habits and outlook; among them a growing proportion have already assimilated—wholly or partially—Western culture. But such persons do not desire to be *racially* assimilated. Their sense of separate race identity is as strong as the Europeans', and there is no reason to assume, therefore, that cultural and economic advancement will lead to miscegenation and inter-marriage. . . .

You say that apartheid furthers "basic human rights," and "does not begrudge the non-White the attainment of a social status commensurate with his highest aspirations." Nowhere in the present political and economic structure of South Africa are possibilities of such attainment to be discovered. . . . Nowhere, moreover, in your Government's policies is any relaxation of such restrictions envisaged in the areas where the ferments of civilisation are most rapidly at work. The trend is towards further curtailment: the only concessions promised are in the reserves. . . . Sixty per cent. of the Native population live outside the reserves, and you give this majority group no hope of basic human rights. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that the only interpretation possible of the phrase "basic human rights" compatible with the policy of apartheid is one which would assign inferior human rights to the black group because it is black.'

The statement then analyses and criticises in detail the section of Dr. Malan's statement dealing with political and social conditions, and concludes:—

'What we regret in your statement is that it breathes an air of complacency, that its factual statements are unrelated to the total situation, that it, above all, gives no grounds for hope to the millions of non-Whites who are not in a Native reserve. Your statement gives the impression that the non-Whites of South Africa should be happy and contented; it fails to recognise the large number that have emerged from barbarism and heathenism and have earned a place in our society as civilised persons. Most unhappily it shows no understanding of the hopelessness and bitterness in the hearts of many of our people or of the mounting racial tensions that threaten the peace of our country.'



## INVESTMENT IN THE GOLD COAST

The conditions on which foreign investment is desired in the Gold Coast were laid down by the Prime Minister in the Legislative Assembly on March 1.

\* First, I should like to draw attention to the importance which this Government attaches to the adoption and vigorous implementation of a policy of training African employees for eventual employment in senior technical, professional, and managerial appointments. The Government wishes to see this policy adopted in both publicly and privately owned enterprises. . . It should, therefore, be understood that the degree of warmth with which any enterprise is welcomed will be conditioned by the arrangements proposed for the employment, training and promotion of Africans. The Government appreciates, however, that in industry the criterion must be that of industrial efficiency. . .

. . . this Government proposes to encourage as much as possible the entry and investment in industry of foreign capital. The Gold Coast has reserve funds which could be made available for investment in large-scale enterprises, and Government will be willing, where it is approached, to participate in enterprises which can be shown to be economically sound. It is not normally proposed to regard Government participation as mandatory but rather to look upon such partnership as a natural means, in the absence of local private capital, of assisting investors to establish a new venture. There may, however, be cases in which Government participation would be calculated to serve the national interest, and the Government must reserve to itself the right to insist on partnership in such future enterprises.

Foreign capital has not hitherto been directly invested in public utilities, such as railway transport, municipal omnibus services, electricity and water supply concerns, telephone and rediffusion services, and it is not expected that there will be any departure from this principle.

With this exception, it is the Government's considered view that foreign capital should be free to invest in any other form of new industrial enterprise. In other words, it is hoped to see new industries established which will in due course become fully self-supporting under normal competitive conditions.

The necessity for price control would not arise in such conditions, and it is intended that control of prices should normally be restricted to industries which operate as monopolies.

It will be appreciated that under the present monetary system in operation local currency can be freely converted into sterling, and in accordance with the

practice of the Sterling Area it has been the policy of the Gold Coast to permit the repatriation of non-sterling funds invested in this country since 1950, and the Government does not envisage any limitation on the present freedom to transfer without restriction profits arising from non-resident capital investment, or to repatriate foreign capital invested in the Gold Coast. It is hoped that this policy will encourage new investment and re-investment of profits.

The present Government has no plans for nationalising industry beyond the extent to which the public utilities are already nationalised, and it does not envisage any such proposals arising. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that if the nationalisation of a particular industry were to be considered essential by a successor Government in the national interest, there should be suitable means for guaranteeing fair compensation, the Government intends to request the United Kingdom Government to incorporate in the Constitution appropriate provision for this purpose following the precedents set in the Constitutions of the United States of America and of India. There should be no doubt left in the minds of foreign enterprises that the Gold Coast is prepared not only to encourage the entry and investment of foreign capital but also to ensure that the interest of investors will be adequately safeguarded. . .

## BULK PURCHASE OF COLONIAL CROPS

In reply to Mr. Willey, the Minister of Food gave details in the House of Commons (May 13, 1954) of bulk purchase and long-term agreements affecting the procurement of foodstuffs for the United Kingdom. The following extract from the written answer refers to the colonial produce affected:—

Commodity.	Country.	Terminal date.
Bacon ... ..	Kenya ... ..	31.12.54
	Jamaica ... ..	31. 8.54
	Uganda ... ..	30. 6.54
	Kenya ... ..	30. 6.54
	Tanganyika ... ..	30. 6.54
Oils and Fats ... ..	Gold Coast ... ..	31. 7.54
	Fiji ... ..	31.12.57
	Nigeria ... ..	30. 6.54
	Gold Coast ... ..	30. 6.54
	Sierra Leone ... ..	30. 6.54
Concentrated Orange Juice	Gambia ... ..	30. 6.54
	Tonga ... ..	31.12.57
	Solomon Islands ... ..	31.12.57
	Gilbert and Ellice ... ..	31.12.57
	British West Indies ... ..	End of Crop Year 1959-60
Sugar ... ..	Sugar Producing Colonies	31.12.61



## CORRESPONDENCE

### Those Sterling Balances

Sir,—Dr. Greaves wishes to deny that she was commissioned to write a report as stated by me 'under a Labour Government.' She seems oblivious of the note appended to her *Colonial Monetary Conditions* by the Colonial Office:—

'The material contained in this Report to the Colonial Economic Research Committee was prepared in the course of a study sponsored by that body and financed by a grant from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds.' (Colonial Research Studies No. 10, H.M.S.O., 1953, p. ii.)

She adds herself, 'This study was begun in 1948 and finished at the end of 1950.' Her study was specified in my article as forming the basis of the Colonial Office statement (*Venture*, March, 1954, p. 9, note 6). Her letter shows the same high sense of relevance as the quotation which I criticised, in which she compared the pre-1914 gold reserve with the expenditure on colonial development.

Balliol College, Oxford.

Yours, etc.,  
T. Balogh.

### East Africa

Sir,—Reading the article *Impressions of Tanganyika* in your May number left me with two main conclusions. Miss Nicholson on her short visit to that territory had realised, firstly, the complacency of the ordinary African to political affairs and even towards improving his labour conditions, and secondly, the vital importance that immigration has in East African affairs.

It is important that this freshly painted picture of the East African scene should be closely studied by others who have not been there. Complacency means self-satisfaction and being pleased with oneself. This is a different picture from that usually painted by many of our own left-wing idealists. They only talk of starvation, land-hunger, oppression, racial hatred, etc., and yet Miss Nicholson's picture of the Tanganyika native in his complacency can be applied equally to the East African native in general, whether in Kenya or Uganda, with, of course, the exception of the Kikuyu.

The question of immigration is undoubtedly the crux of East Africa's problems. It is as if every immigrant has disturbed the stagnant pool of African complacency, whether he was European or Asian, whether he was a British official or a Government-sponsored unofficial as a settler. Many of the latter have no doubt by their political demands made such a splash as to turn a gentle ripple into waves of trouble. On the other hand it has been the unofficial immigrant, whether European or Asian, who by farming or business has developed the economy of the East African territories. Immigration was necessary in the past if anything was to be made of Africa and the African. Now it is being viewed as a blot on the landscape. But there can be no practical consideration of the future of the East African territories under the experiment of a multi-racial society without initial decisions on the future of immigration. The governing Councils of the territories planning economic development must know, business concerns, whether European, Asian or African must know, overseas investors of capital will require to know, and all political planners concerned with future policy must know.

Whether immigration is to be openly maintained, increased and encouraged, or restricted and qualified are issues that go deeper than shallow surface politics. It is a problem transcending the whims of prejudiced wranglers and racial bigots. Naturally, Fabians are concerned that future policy in our Colonies should conform to their idea of a democratic British way of life with adequate protection for all workers of all races. But at this stage it is important they realise that local problems of immigration are rapidly merging into the serious world problem of migration, with implications that extend to their very selves and their own way of life in the future.

Yours faithfully,  
Derick Taylor.

Wimbledon, S.W.19.

[Marjorie Nicholson comments: 'I did not use the word "complacent" in the same context as Mr. Taylor. "Apathetic" would be nearer the mark, and does not convey the impression of contentment which Mr. Taylor emphasises. I did find some complacency—by no means confined to Africans—and also, amongst all races, some very wide-awake and politically active persons. My even briefer visit to Uganda did not lead me to share Mr. Taylor's view of Uganda Africans—I found the atmosphere in Buganda much more reminiscent of West Africa.]

Sir,—I would like to comment on Miss Nicholson's article *Impressions of Tanganyika* in your May number.

What she says about the apathy, the complacency and the sporadic and isolated manner in which some right thinking at all is being done, is all very true. Most of the enlightened Africans are in Government service, and the ban on Government servants taking part in politics, necessary as it is, prevents this most important section of the community from ventilating whatever may be going on from within. The percentage of Africans in Tanganyika enjoying a satisfactory standard of living is much smaller than in Kenya and especially in Uganda. In this Protectorate, the coffee and the cotton grower have directly shared in the prosperity that has befallen the co-operative (and individuals or families) handling these commodities. In Tanganyika, the two most important exports are sisal and diamonds. Throughout the boom period, the sisal labourer's lot remained unchanged, his income remaining fixed. He may have eaten better or slept better, but his dependence on his employer remains. The great difference between the cost of production and the selling price went to a few only. In the case of diamonds, the set-up is even more inequitable. So, by and large, the only attractive field that remained was Government service, and this meant only cautious expression of views.

Of course, we have the Bukoba coffee grower and the Chagga who compare favourably with their Uganda counterparts, and these in fact illustrate the point that only by achieving economic independence can the African succeed in becoming constructively articulate, and in Tanganyika the most important industries, sisal and diamonds, do not permit anything like this at all. Perhaps it can be argued that the revenue earned by the country by way of taxes, royalties, etc., is then used for the same purpose (and more sensibly), i.e. for the betterment of the lot of the masses. It still remains to be seen whether, granting that this is in fact, being done, such a bureaucratic NEW DEAL is a proper substitute for individual initiative based on direct incentive on the co-operative level. I do not think that the former can ever take the place of the latter, either in equity or in efficiency.

Yours faithfully,  
Amir H. Jamal.

Dar-es-Salaam.



# Parliament

**Husbandry and Marketing in Nyasaland.** Mr. James Johnson asked how much of the 300,000 acres which had been bought by the Government, following the recommendations of the Abrahams Commission, had been so far allocated to Africans; the terms of this allocation; and what steps the Agricultural Department were taking to ensure good husbandry and co-operative marketing. Mr. Hopkinson said that all the land referred to was available for Africans and most of it was, in fact, already heavily settled at the time of its acquisition. In most areas the land acquired was treated as public land, but it was intended that when areas were fully developed they should revert to African trust land. As regards agricultural measures on the land acquired concentration of huts permitting economic land usage and contour bunding had been completed or was under way; planting of useful trees was being encouraged; 35 successful boreholes had been sunk; hillside and stream banks were being protected; land was being demarcated to allow of alternate cultivation and fallow; many miles of track had been made or improved to permit easy access and extraction of produce. No steps had been taken to introduce co-operative marketing since adequate alternative co-operative arrangements already existed through the Produce Co-operative Board and the African Tobacco Board. (May 5, 1954.)

**Care of Families of Detained Persons in Kenya.** Mrs. Eirene White asked whether the Colonial Secretary was aware of the hardship caused to families when the breadwinner was detained indefinitely; and what steps had been taken to deal with a problem which was causing bitterness among those concerned. Mr. Hopkinson said that he was not aware of any general hardship among families of detained persons, but there were arrangements for relief to be given in cases of need. Mrs. White, in a supplementary question, urged the need of those families who could not return to the reserve and asked what steps were being taken to make it clear to those who could not find other means of subsistence that some welfare arrangements were available. Mr. Hopkinson said that he hoped that the publicity given to Parliamentary questions would help to make it better known in Kenya and that he would draw the attention of the Government to the need to make clear to everybody the arrangements that existed for relief. (April 28, 1954.)

**Gifts to British Honduras.** Mr. Reid asked the total amount of grants in aid and special gifts to British Honduras since 1931. In reply, Mr. Lyttelton said that the total sum was £3,675,344 comprising grants in aid, Colonial Development and Welfare schemes, Hurricane Relief, and loss on currency revaluation. (May 12, 1954.)

**Unemployment in Singapore.** In reply to a ques-

tion by Mr. Awbery, Mr. Lyttelton said that figures of unemployed in Singapore were not available, but that there was no evidence that unemployment was widespread. The existing system of relief was considered adequate to deal with the present situation, but that he had already addressed a message to the Governor on the use of public works for relief of unemployment. (May 12, 1954.)

**Elections in British Honduras.** Mr. Sorensen asked for a statement on the election and whether it had been conducted in strict accordance with legal and constitutional requirements. Mr. Hopkinson replied that the Colonial Secretary hoped to make a statement later. There had been no suggestions that the election had not been conducted in strict accordance with legal and constitutional requirements. (May 5, 1954.)

**Police Searches in Jamaica.** In response to questions by Mr. D. T. Jones and Mr. M. Orbach, Mr. Hopkinson said that searches took place for importation of publications prohibited under the Undesirable Publications Law. In the premises which included the offices of the Federation of Trade Unions and the People's Education Organisation the police had found a considerable volume of Communist literature but no prohibited publications. He added that there was no connection between the People's Education Organisation and the Extra-Mural Department of the University College of the West Indies. (May 5, 1954.)

**Secondary Education in Kenya.** Mr. J. Johnson asked how many African boys and girls took the recent Cambridge Overseas School Certificate at the Nairobi Alliance School and Girls' High School, respectively; and how many places at Makerere College had been allotted to Kenya and Nyasaland respectively. Mr. Lyttelton replied that 49 African boys from the Alliance School and five African girls had taken the 1953 Cambridge School Certificate Examination and all had passed. 25 per cent. of the places at Makerere College had been allotted to Kenya and 5 per cent. to the Central African Territories. There had been no applicants from Nyasaland so far this year. (May 12, 1954.)

**East African Co-operative Training School.** Mr. Beswick asked how many students were now attending the School and from what territories they had come; what difficulties were being experienced with regard to the staffing and financing of the School. Mr. Lyttelton said that no figures were available for 1954, but in 1953 there were two courses attended by eight co-operative officers from Kenya, 12 from Tanganyika and 12 from Uganda. Proposals for an additional tutor and for a permanent building were under consideration by the three Governments concerned. (May 12, 1954.)



## Guide to Books

### Black Argosy

By Mercedes Mackay. (Putnam, 12s. 6d.)

To the average citizen of the United Kingdom one dark-skinned person is as good or as bad as any other. West Africans are mistaken for Indians; and West Indians are confused with Egyptians without a blush or the batting of an eyelid. That there are wide divergences of culture, education, and racial origin between so-called Coloured people is known to few. But even these few seldom pay regard to these differences when making generalisations about Colonials. The growth of the population of West Africans in Britain during the post-war years has meant that more English people come into personal contact with Negroes at work, if not at home. And yet it is the home life of these visitors which is particularly interesting. It is a wonder that the varied experiences of African students, and their counter-part the stowaways, have not been used until recently as the material of a novel or a travel book. A novel just published under the title of *Black Argosy* does just this.

The author is an unquestioned authority on the subject of the welfare of West African students in the United Kingdom. As a fellow-writer of the B.B.C. monthly newsletter the present reviewer was able to observe Mrs. Mackay's activities in this field since her return from Nigeria some years ago. Her book describes the adventures of two Yoruba men (she refers to them as boys!) from Ibadan in Nigeria. The one, Ben Akintola, comes to England as an 'un-sponsored' law student, and by dint of hard work and perseverance, becomes 'a highly conventional Englishman.' The other, Edun Banjeje, a ne'er-do-well who comes over as a stowaway, is shunned by society and relegated to a life in the Stepney slums, to drug trafficking. Eventually, he murders a fellow-addict and is hanged for the crime. The plot is good and the story woven so true to life that one is irritated by a few casual excursions from the realm of facts to that of fiction and imagination.

*Black Argosy* is a book I heartily recommend to all those who are concerned about the welfare of Negroes in Britain, whatever their particular field of

activity may be. For example, I know of no better description of the abortive rôle of colonial hostels in fostering Anglo-African co-operation than Mrs. Mackay's. Her portrayal of the mentality of the more mediocre law student is brilliant. The author is, however, very much less convincing when she attempts to relate day-to-day happenings to a background of primitive African folklore and customary practices. It is a pity, also, that she gives the impression of being a missionary rather than a comrade.

*Olumbe Bassir.*

### A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1952-53

(South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 5s.)

An admirable array of facts and figures covering every aspect of South African life, domestic and external. In spite of improvements in health, housing and education, increased restrictions on civil liberties, discriminatory legislation, and segregation do not make happy reading. The Director of the Institute, in his introduction points out that the emphasis in the racial situation has shifted from the welfare to the political. South Africans must re-examine their fundamental beliefs and the Churches consider the logical conclusions of their theological premises. Apartheid can only be realised at the cost of labour. Yet such is the shortage of labour in the Union in mining, farming and transport that 'European' jobs are being opened to non-whites. (In 1953 12,000 were 'temporarily' given European jobs on the railways alone.) Despite the increasing use of African industrial labour, African trade unions are denied official recognition, and the Minister of Labour went so far as to observe last August that if the Government machinery set up to deal with African labour were successful, trade unions would probably die a natural death.

The Institute reports that the Joint Councils set up in many South African towns are suffering from an increased unwillingness of non-Europeans to serve on them, as the spirit of non-co-operation develops. Despite this, the Institute believes that European racial attitudes are changing and that new thinking and new forces will yet win the race with time and revolution in South Africa.

*Molly Mortimer.*

### CONTENTS OF THIS NUMBER

For Reference	June, 1954
Next Phase in Kenya - - - - -	1
<b>Comment—</b>	
Still Retrenching - - - - -	3
Let Them Earn - - - - -	3
Lessons from Indo-China by Colin Jackson - - -	4
Labour Fights Malan by E. S. Sachs - - - - -	5
<b>Opinion—</b>	
The Constitution of Malaya - - - - -	6
The Basis of Apartheid - - - - -	7
<b>Fact—</b>	
Investment in the Gold Coast - - - - -	9
Bulk Purchase of Colonial Crops - - - - -	9
Correspondence - - - - -	10
Parliament - - - - -	11
Guide to Books - - - - -	12

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